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Manufacturer origin attestation for device user authorization
ABSTRACT
This disclosure describes techniques for user authentication and authorization for
devices with support for manufacturer origin attestation. A client attestation certificate allows an
authorization service to associate a device with its manufacturer (client). A unique client
identifier is assigned by the authorization service to the client. The client assigns a unique
instance certificate to each device. During initial authorization, each device uses a trusted local
channel to establish identification before the authorization service and obtain an authorization
code. The authorization code, the device instance attestation certificate chain, and a proof of
possession of the instance key, in the form of a signed message that includes the authorization
code, are supplied by the device for verification. Upon verification of the supplied code and the
signed message, the authorization service returns user credentials for the device.
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Provisioning of devices for applications often includes creating device authorization
credentials. The credentials are often based on proof-of-possession of a private key. Currently
used authentication mechanisms based on device cryptographic credentials are vulnerable to
supply chain attacks. Mechanisms based on bearer tokens are vulnerable to token theft.
Establishing device credentials that also authenticate the manufacturer of the device can provide
additional guarantees for users and also allow for the implementation of controls based on
manufacturer-restricted content licenses.
DESCRIPTION
This disclosure describes techniques for performing user authentication and
authorization for devices and device-based applications that incorporate manufacturer origin
attestation.
Client registration
Registration with a user's authentication/authorization service (or identity provider) is
undertaken by a manufacturer of devices or developer of device-based apps (hereinafter referred
to as the 'client”). With the client registration process, a client attestation certificate is associated
with the client by the authorization service. The authorization service is in possession of a public
key, while the client is in possession of the associated private key.
The private key serves as a cryptographic signing key for the client. In addition, a
unique client identifier is assigned by the authorization service to the client. The unique client
identifier can be an arbitrary identifier that is unique to the authorization service registration
records, or can be an identifier cryptographically derived from the client attestation certificate,
such as a certificate fingerprint. The client attestation certificate can be used to issue additional
certificates for specific instances of devices and apps created by the client.
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Instance certificate assignment
The client assigns a unique certificate to each device or instance of an application
running on the device. The instance certificate is certified by the attestation certificate of the
client, with a direct signature or a chain of intermediate certificates as necessary. This creates an
instance attestation certificate chain. The authenticity of the chain can be verified as belonging to
the registered client by the authorization service. The last certificate in the chain is referred to as
the instance certificate and the corresponding private key as the instance key.
The instance key is stored by the device, and in the case of a key associated with an app,
protected from access by other apps on the same device. For example, if the device includes a
trusted platform module (TPM), the TPM can be involved in the generation of the instance
certificate. This provides a strong guarantee against theft of the private key.
For example, a manufacturer of smart speakers can obtain a client attestation certificate.
Subsequently, for each speaker manufactured, a unique instance certificate for each device is
created and certified with the client attestation certificate or with an intermediate certificate,
where the intermediate certificate is itself certified by the client attestation certificate. The
resulting instance attestation certificate chain can be installed on the speaker.
Initial authentication/authorization request
At the time of initializing the use of the device or app, the client device or app
communicates with the authorization service to request that a user credential, e.g., an
authorization code, be placed in the device. The user credential enables the device or app to
access resources on behalf of the user. Initially, the client device or app is not authorized and
holds no credentials for the user account with the authorization service.
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The authorization can be carried out from a second trusted device or an app that holds
the credentials. For the trusted device to establish the identification of the new device or app to
the authorization service, it is sufficient for the trusted device to securely obtain the instance
certificate, or associated fingerprint, from the second trusted device. A trusted local channel
between the devices can be used for this purpose. For example, the trusted local channel may be
a browser that the user is signed in to.
Authorization code exchange
During the authorization code exchange, the device or app and the authorization service
are in direct communication. The authorization code, the instance attestation certificate chain,
and a proof of possession of the instance key, in the form of a signed message that includes the
authorization code, are supplied by the device or app.
The authorization code is validated by the authorization service. In addition, the instance
attestation certificate chain is validated to be a valid certificate chain, where each certificate
includes a valid signature issued by the parent. The root certificate of the chain is verified to be
registered by the client that matches the client identifier previously presented at the authorization
request that produced the authorization code. The authorization service also verifies that the leaf
certificate of the chain (the instance certificate) matches the fingerprint presented in the original
authorization request.
In addition, the authorization server can verify the signature that proves possession of
the instance key and validate that the authorization code is embedded in the proof. For example,
the proof can be a signed message in the JSON Web Token format (JWT), Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML) assertion format, etc.

http://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/841

5

de Medeiros et al.: Manufacturer origin attestation for device user authorization

The signature incorporates the instance certificate fingerprint and the authorization
code, and is signed with the instance key. The signature represents a cryptographic attestation
that states that: (a) The device or app holds legitimate certificates and keys issued by the client
manufacturer; and (b) it is the same instance or unit that the user intended to grant access.
The authorization service returns credentials for the device. The authorization service
can return a short timespan credential, e.g., an access token per the OAuth standard, in exchange
for the authorization code. While this illustrative example describes use of an OAuth credential,
the described techniques can utilize other authorization/authentication protocols that return a
single use artifact. The access token can be used by the device to access user resources. The
authorization service can also simultaneously issue a long timespan credential, e.g., a refresh
token per the OAuth standard, that can be used to obtain additional credentials in the future, e.g.,
after the original credential has expired. The authorization service can ensure that an
authorization code is exchanged only once to provide freshness of device authentication.
The user-specific device credentials created using the disclosed techniques can be used
to improve security of long timespan credentials by the creation of an authorization-event
specific client credential, and by issuing a key and certificate specific to that authorization. That
certificate is signed with the instance key, and is an extension of the instance attestation
certificate chain.
This allows the authorization server to cache the authorization-event specific public key.
Identifiers for the instance certificate need not be stored on the server. This can lead to less
sensitive information being stored on the server, and allows for the authorization-event specific
private keys to be deleted from the device, e.g., when the device is reset. This effectively revokes
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authorization without involvement of the authorization service. Since the authorization-event
specific key is generated dynamically, it is less vulnerable to supply-chain attacks.

Fig. 1: Device authorization in an OAuth based service
Fig. 1 illustrates the use of the dynamically generated keys in an OAuth standard based
service for authorization. The device class or type is registered (130) as a client (142) with an
authorization server (120) by the manufacturer of the device. The authorization server provides a
client identifier (144) to the manufacturer. Each manufactured device (110) is then assigned an
instance attestation certificate chain and the client identifier (146) during manufacture or
provisioning.
A user authorization request, along the client identifier and the instance attestation
certificate, and mediated by a trusted agent, is transmitted (148) by the device to the
authorization server. The client identifier and the instance attestation certificate are verified by
the authorization server to successfully approve the user (150). Upon approval, an authorization
code (152) which serves as a user credential, is provided to the device.
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During subsequent communication, the device can transmit a signed message (154) that
includes the authorization code, a client assertion, the instance certificate, and the instance
attestation certificate chain. The authorization server verifies (156) the contents of the signed
message, and on successful verification, the instance certificate is stored along with a refresh
token.
The refresh token, an access token, and an optional challenge is returned (158) to the
device. The challenge is used by the client to create subsequent assertions that provide a
freshness guarantee by requiring a response from the device.
The described techniques can also incorporate key establishment wherein the device
generates key negotiation material, such as a pre-key factor, instead of a new certificate. This can
be useful in devices with hardware constraints that can lead to the construction of
cryptographically weak certificates. During authorization code exchange, the device assertion
can include a reference to the pre-key material. The server then responds with its own pre-key
factor, in addition to any tokens. A key establishment process allows the client instance to derive
a private key incorporating both sets of pre-key material, in a manner that enables the
authorization server to derive the corresponding public key only. The server can bind this newly
negotiated key pair to the refresh token for client authentication, as described above. The client
instance can record the private key as its authorization-event specific, client key.
The described techniques can be used in hardware such as security cameras, smart home
speakers, Internet-connected media playback devices, etc. and are suitable for deployment of
Internet-of-Things (IoT) device hubs and other computing devices such as smartphones and other
computing appliances. The described techniques can also be adopted as extension of OAuth2,
and present a complementary approach to OAuth2 POP draft standard
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CONCLUSION
This disclosure describes techniques for user authentication and authorization for
devices with support for manufacturer origin attestation. Device attestation is enabled through
the use of manufacturer installed keys. User authorization is represented by key pairs generated
on demand by the device. The techniques are suitable for deployment on a variety of devices,
and can be adapted easily to different standards and protocols for use in authorization and
authentication.
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